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Show Me Exactly What You Found: The Private Search Doctrine, Riley v. California, and Digital
Data
Joshua Koodray
Introduction
Men have become the tools of their tools.
- Henry David Thoreau
Henry David Thoreau could not have - or cared to for that matter- imagined the
advancements in technology made since his death in 1862.1 Today, digital technology permeates
every aspect of our daily lives. As a society, we have become dependent on our electronic
devices and it seems that life, as we know it would cease without them.2 According to the Pew
Research Center, as of January 2014 90% of American adults own a cell phone.3 Of those
individuals, 68% of them own a smartphone.4 Today, 73% of American adults own a
desktop/laptop computer and 45% own a tablet computer.5 84% of American adults use the
Internet.6 We truly do live digital lives.7 Considering these statistics, it is no wonder that the

1
Richard J. Schneider, Thoreau’s Life, The Thoreau Society (last visited November 22, 2016)
http://www.thoreausociety.org/life-legacy.

2
Associated Press, Growing Dependence On Technology Raises Risks of Malfunction, Crain’s New York
Business (July 9, 2015) http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20150709/TECHNOLOGY/150709895/growingdependence-on-technology-raises-risks-of-malfunction.

3
Pew Research Center, Mobile Technology Fact Sheet (December 27, 2013)
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/.

4
Monica Anderson, The Demographics of Device Ownership, Pew Research Center (October 29, 2015)
(This figure constitutes a 33% increase from mid-2011) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/the-demographicsof-device-ownership/.

5
Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, Pew Research Center (October 29, 2015)
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/.

6
Andrew Perrin and Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000-2015, Pew Research Center (June
26, 2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-2000-2015/.

7

collection of digital evidence has become essential to law enforcement.8 This is particularly true
in cases involving child pornography.9
However, what about cases in which private individuals discover incriminating evidence on
their own? This often occurs in cases involving child pornography and raises challenging Fourth
Amendment questions. For instance, when a private party searches a computer, sees a suspicious
file, and reports the finding to the police, what kind of government search of the computer may
take place? Do police exceed the scope of the warrantless “private search doctrine,” which
allows them to verify the illegality of evidence discovered by a private party, if they open files
other than those originally opened by the third party? Answering these questions become more
complicated after the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California.10
This paper will first examine the background Fourth Amendment principles and the
development of the private search doctrine. Then this paper will analyze the ways in which the
private search doctrine is applied to the digital world. Third, this paper will analyze the Supreme
Court’s decision in Riley and its impact on the application of the private search doctrine in cases
involving digital data. Lastly, the author calls for the United States Supreme Court to take action
and settle the current circuit split.

Janna Anderson and Lee Rainie, Digital Life in 2025, Pew Research Center (March 11, 2014) (noting that
experts predict the Internet will become “‘like electricity’ – less visible, yet more deeply embedded in people’s lives
for good and ill”) http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/03/11/digital-life-in-2025/

8
See Sean E. Goodison, Robert C. Davis, and Brian A. Jackson, Digital Evidence and the U.S. Criminal
Justice System, National Criminal Justice Reference Service, at 1 (last visited November 11, 2016) (modern devices
serve as huge repositories of personal information yet be carried in a pocket and accessed with a single hand or even
voice command) https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248770.pdf

9
Id. at 7.

10
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (police officers may not search an individual’s cellphone
incident to arrest and must generally secure a warrant before conducting a search of an arrestee’s cell phone).

Please note: Many of the cases analyzed herein involve sensitive and often disturbing facts.
The author is cognizant of that. Accordingly, the author did his best to balance the need for the
requisite factual detail required in any Fourth Amendment analysis with the realities of each
case.

I.The Fourth Amendment and The Private Search Doctrine
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizure, shall not be violated…11
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individuals and their
property from unreasonable searches and seizures.12 In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”13 In order for a search to
implicate the Fourth Amendment, it must violate an individual’s legitimate expectation of
privacy.14 In his often-citied concurrence, Justice Harlan articulated a two-pronged test to assess
whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy.15 First, an individual must have

11
U.S. Const. amend. IV.

12
Id.

13
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

14
See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 (1971) (holding that a search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because it “infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy and hence was not a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment).

15
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that a “twofold requirement” is utilized
to determine whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 740 (1979) (stating that the Harlan test “embraces two discrete questions”); Thomas K. Clancy, The Search and
Seizure of Computers and Electronic Evidence: The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures:
A Perspective and a Primer, 75 Miss. L.J. 193, 221 (Fall 205) (“A person seeking to challenge the propriety of a
governmental search must establish that she has a protected interest, which the Supreme Court measures by
ascertaining whether she ahs a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by the government.”).

exhibited an actual expectation of privacy – the subjective prong – and second, that expectation
must be recognized by society as reasonable – the objective prong.16 Today, the Supreme court
states that a Fourth Amendment search does not occur unless “the individual manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search,” and “society [is] willing
to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”17
Under the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, warrantless searches are considered per
se unreasonable.18 However, the Supreme Court has adopted some limited exceptions to the
warrant requirement.19 Generally, a warrantless search will only be upheld if the government’s
interest in gathering or preserving evidence outweighs an individual’s privacy interest. 20 The
Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rules generally establish that evidence obtained, as the result

16
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has emerged
from prior decisions is that a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be on that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”);
see also Priscilla Grantham Adams, Fourth Amendment Applicability: Private Searches, National Center for Justice
and Rule of Law, http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncjrl/pdf/PrivateSearchDoctrine.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2016);
Marc Palumbo, Note: How Safe Is Your Data?: Conceptualizing Hard Drives Under the Fourth Amendment, 36
Fordham Urb. L.J. 977, 982 (2009).

17
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1976)).

18
See U.S. Const. amend. IV. (“[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularity describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to see seized.”); Katz,
389 U.S. at 357 (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specially established and welldelineated exceptions.”).

19
See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6 (applying the plain view exception to law enforcement
search of dorm room); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (adopting the search incident to arrest
exception and stating that it is reasonable for law enforcement to search a person being lawfully arrested for
weapons or evidence); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155 (1925) (creating the motor vehicle exception,
which allows police to search a motor vehicle based on probable cause that contraband or relevant evidence will be
uncovered).

20
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2478 (2014) (“the Court generally determines whether to exempt
a given type of search from the warrant requirement “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes
upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is need for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))).

of an unlawful search, is not admissible against a criminal defendant.21 However, the pervious
considerations are irrelevant unless a government agent conducts the challenged search.22
The Fourth Amendment is not implicated unless the government or one of its agents
conducts the search in question.23 Accordingly, an unreasonable search or seizure conducted by a
private individual does not violate the Fourth Amendment.24 Therefore, as long as the private
individual conducting the search is not acting as an agent for the government, the discovered
evidence is admissible against a criminal defendant.25 Consequently, the private search doctrine
implicates two relevant considerations: (1) whether the searching party is a private individual or
government agent, and (2) how far beyond the scope of the initial search can law enforcement go
without obtaining a warrant. The following sections address each of these considerations in turn.
A. The Government Agent Test
Determining whether an individual is acting as a government agent or private actor is a caseby-case inquiry, which considers the totality of the circumstances.26 Reviewing courts will
consider (1) whether the government knew of, acquiesced, instigated, compensated or otherwise
encouraged the search, and (2) whether the private actor’s purpose was to assist law

21
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)(holding that evidence obtained in searches and seizures that
violate the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible).

22
See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (noting that the Fourth Amendment protects against
unlawful searches and seizures and that protection applies only to governmental action).

23
Id.

24
See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (explaining that Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to
unreasonable searches by a private individual).

25
See Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443, 487-90 (1971).

26
See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1989); See also Adams, Fourth
Amendment Applicability: Private Searches, National Center for Justice and Rule of Law,
http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncjrl/pdf/PrivateSearchDoctrine.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).

enforcement.27 Generally, “mere knowledge and passive acquiesce by the government” is not
enough.28 Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at NYU’s Information Law
Institute and Visiting Fellow at Yale Law School’s Information Society Project, describes the
second criterion of the test to largely be a “mirage[.]”29 He explains that because the test is
derived from common law agency principles, “A does not become B’s agent simply because A
acts: (1) in a way to benefit B; and (2) out of a desire to benefit B.”30 Instead, there must be some
action on B’s part.31 Therefore, Brennan-Marquez concludes that it is hardly surprising that a
Fourth Amendment test patterned on agency principles would “inspire courts to treat prodding by
law enforcement (of some kind) as a necessary, if not always sufficient, condition of state
action.”32

27
United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The general principles for determining whether
a private individual is acting as a governmental instrument or agent for Fourth Amendment purposes has been
synthesized into a two part test. According to this test, we must inquire: (1) whether the government knew of and
acquiesced in the intrusive conduct; and (2) whether the party performing the search intended to assist law
enforcement efforts or further his own ends.”); see also, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Article: Outsourced Law
Enforcement, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 797, 806 (2016) (analyzing the development of the private search doctrine and
interpretation of the government agent test by the lower courts).

28
See, eg., United States v. Leffall, 82 F.3d 343, 347 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a government agent must
be involved directly as a participant, not a mere witness, or indirectly as an encourager of the private person’s
search); United States v. Crowley, 285 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting a key factor of the test is whether the
government requested the action or offered the individual a reward).

29
Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Article: Outsourced Law Enforcement, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 797, 806 (2016).

30
Id. (citing United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, (4th Cir. 2003) (looking to the “common law of
agency” to determine whether a private actor was operating as a state agent)).

31
Id. (citing 19 Williston on Contracts § 54:14 (4th ed. 2015) (explaining that “the relationship of principal
and agent…requires mutual consent,” and in particular that it “turns on the intentions and actions of the putative
principal, not the agent.”)).

32
Id. at 807.

The Supreme Court first introduced the concept of the private search doctrine in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire.33 In this case, police suspected that Edward Coolidge was involved with the
kidnapping and murder of a fourteen-year-old girl, Pamela Mason.34 After learning that Coolidge
had been away from home on the evening of Mason’s disappearance, the police went to the
Coolidge residence to question him.35 During the initial interview, Coolidge denied any
wrongdoing and voluntarily surrendered two shotguns and a rifle to the police.36 He also agreed
to take a lie-detector test concerning his statements regarding his whereabouts on the night of
Mason’s disappearance.37
On the following Sunday, Coolidge reported to the police station where the lie detector
would be administered, while two plainclothes policemen went to the Coolidge residence.38
There, the plainclothes officers encountered Mrs. Coolidge and informed her that her husband
was in “serious trouble.”39 The officers proceeded to question Mrs. Coolidge, who voluntarily
turned over four guns and some clothes she believed her husband was wearing on the evening of

33
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (“Had Mrs. Coolidge, wholly on her own
initiative, sought out her husband’s guns and clothing and then taken them to the police station to be used as
evidence against him, there can be no doubt under existing law that the articles would later have been admissible in
evidence.”).

34
Id. at 445.

35
Id.

36
Id.

37
Id.

38
Id. at 446.

39
Id.

Mason’s disappearance.40 The evidence incriminated Coolidge, who was ultimately convicted of
kidnapping and murder and sentenced to life in prison.41
Prior to his conviction, Coolidge moved to suppress the evidence voluntarily surrendered to
law enforcement by his wife.42 Coolidge argued that his wife was acting as an “instrument” of
law enforcement when she brought out his guns and clothing and handed them over to the
officers.43 Therefore, Coolidge asserted that he was the victim of an unlawful search and
seizure.44 The Supreme Court rejected Coolidge’s argument and upheld the denial of his motion
to suppress.45
The Coolidge Court found that the officers did not “coerce or dominate” Mrs. Coolidge in
any way.46 Instead, they stated that the officers did nothing more than direct her actions by the
“more subtle techniques of suggestion that are available to officials in circumstances like
these.”47 The Court noted that to hold otherwise would be “to hold, in effect, that a criminal
suspect has constitutional protection against the adverse consequences of a spontaneous, goodfaith effort by his wife to clear him of suspicion.”48 The Court explained further that it is not part
of the underlying policy of the Fourth Amendment to “discourage citizens from aiding to the
40
Id.

41
Id. at 448.

42
Id. at 487.

43
Id.

44
Id.

45
Id. at 489.

46
Id.

47
Id. at 489-90.

48
Id. at 490.

utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals.”49 The Coolidge Court made clear that
the Fourth Amendment was not triggered in this case.50
The Supreme Court limited the private search doctrine in its decision in Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives’ Labor Association.51 In Skinner, the Court considered regulations promulgated
after the passage of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 to combat problems of alcohol and
drug abuse by railroad employees.52 The regulations made post-accident toxicological testing
mandatory.53 Accordingly, the railroad companies were obligated by the regulations to collect
blood and urine samples after the occurrence of any number of railway incidents.54 Numerous
employees and labor unions challenged the regulations as a violation of their Fourth Amendment
rights.55
The Skinner Court first considered whether the Fourth Amendment was implicated by these
tests.56 The Court held that the breath and urine tests required by the railroad companies in
compliance with the regulations are searches that implicate the Fourth Amendment.57 The Court

49
Id.

50
Id.; see also Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Article: Outsourced Law Enforcement, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 797,
802 (2016) (“In short, when Mrs. Coolidge provided evidence to the police, she was acting of her own volition, not
as an instrument of the state. So the Fourth Amendment, far from being violated, was not even triggered.).

51
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).

52
Id. at 606-07.

53
Id. at 609.

54
Id.

55
Id. at 612.

56
See Id. at 613-14 (“Before we consider whether the tests in question are reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, we must inquire whether the tests are attributable to the Government or its agents, and whether they
amount to searches or seizures.”).

57

further stated that private actors become agents or instruments of the state if they are legally
required to perform such searches.58 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, explained to hold
otherwise would allow legislative bodies to circumvent Fourth Amendment protection at will by
deputizing private actors to perform searches that would otherwise fall to law enforcement.59
Government action that is not compelled may still qualify as a Fourth Amendment search, if the
government “removes all legal barriers to [a given type of search] and indeed [makes] plain not
only its strong preference for [searches], but also its desire to share the fruits of [the]
intrusions.”60 While the Skinner Court ultimately upheld the regulations as constitutional,61 the
decision limited the private search doctrine in explaining that a seemingly private actor may
become a de facto government agent by complying with government regulations.62
B. How Far Is Too Far?: Defining The Scope Of Law Enforcement’s Subsequent Warrantless
Search

Id. at 614.

58
Id. at 614-16 (“The fact that the Government has not compelled a private party to perform a search does
not, by itself, establish that the search is a private one. Here, specific features of the regulations combine to convince
us that the Government did more than adopt a passive position toward the underlying private conduct.”).

59
Id. at 615-16 (“In light of these provisions, we are unwilling to accept petitioners' submission that tests
conducted by private railroads in reliance on Subpart D will be primarily the result of private initiative.”); see also
Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Article: Outsourced Law Enforcement, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 797, 803 (2016)

60
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615.

61
Id. at 633. (“We conclude that the compelling Government interests served by the FRA's regulations
would be significantly hindered if railroads were required to point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable
suspicion of impairment before testing a given employee. In view of our conclusion that, on the present record, the
toxicological testing contemplated by the regulations is not an undue infringement on the justifiable expectations of
privacy of covered employees, the Government's compelling interests outweigh privacy concerns.”).

62
Id. at 615-16. (“The Government has removed all legal barriers to the testing authorized by Subpart D,
and indeed has made plain not only its strong preference for testing, but also its desire to share the fruits of such
intrusions. In addition, it has mandated that the railroads not bargain away the authority to perform tests granted by
Subpart D. These are clear indices of the Government's encouragement, endorsement, and participation, and suffice
to implicate the Fourth Amendment.”).

In Walter v. United States, the Supreme Court considered a “bizarre” set of facts that
implicated the Fourth Amendment’s private search doctrine.63 In this case, a shipment containing
871 boxes of eight-millimeter film was sent from St. Petersburg, Florida, to Atlanta, Georgia.64
The package was addressed to “Leggs, Inc.[,]” but was mistakenly delivered to “L’Eggs
Products, Inc.”65 Upon arrival, L’Eggs Products’ employees inspected the shipment and its
contents.66 The boxes’ labels displayed “suggestive drawings” of homosexual sexual activity and
“explicit descriptions” of their contents.67 One of the employees then opened one or two of the
boxes and unsuccessfully attempted to view portions of the film by holding it up to the light.68
The employees then contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”), who subsequently
seized the films.69 The FBI then viewed the films with a projector “without making any effort to
obtain a warrant or to communicate with the consignor or the consignee of the shipment.”70
Petitioners were subsequently indicted and convicted on obscenity charges relating to the
interstate transportation of the films after their motion to suppress evidence of the films was
denied.71

63
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651 (1980).

64
Id. at 651.

65
Id.

66
Id.

67
Id. at 652.

68
Id.

69
Id.

70
Id.

71
Id.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the convictions after finding that the
FBI’s “unauthorized exhibition of films constituted an unreasonable invasion of their owner’s
constitutionally protected interest in privacy.”72 Justice Stevens, writing on behalf of the
majority, noted that it was “perfectly obvious” that the agents’ reason for viewing the films was
to determine whether the owner was guilty of a federal crime.73 However, while the labels gave
the agents probable cause to believe the films were obscene they were not sufficient to support a
conviction.74 Justice Stevens took care to note that just because the FBI agents lawfully
possessed the films, they did not automatically have authority to search their contents.“75
Additionally, the fact that the packages had been opened by a private party before they were
acquired by the FBI does not “excuse the failure to obtain a search warrant.”76 While the private
search by the L’Eggs employees “frustrated that expectation in part[,]” it did not “simply strip
the remaining unfrustrated portion of that expectation of all Fourth Amendment protection.”77
Nearly forty years later, in United States v. Jacobsen, the Supreme Court held that a
government agent’s warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it is simply a
replication of a search already conducted by a private party.78 In Jacobsen, Federal Express

72
Id. at 654.

73
Id.

74
Id.

75
Id. (“Ever since 1878 when Mr. Justice Field’s opinion for the court in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,
established that sealed packages in the mail cannot be opened without a warrant, it has been settled than an officer’s
authority to possess a package is distinct from his authority to examine its contents.”).

76
Id. at 656.

77
Id.

78
See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 116-19 (1984) (describing the standard for analyzing
warrantless searches by a government agent of an item already searched by a party); See also Katie Matejka, Note:

(“FedEx”) employees working at Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport accidently damaged and tore a
package with a forklift.79 Pursuant to company policy, an office manager inspected the damaged
package and opened it to examine the contents.80 Inside, the office manager discovered four ziplock plastic bags containing about six and a half ounces of white powder.81 Suspecting the
substance to be cocaine, the FedEx employees notified the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA).82
The first DEA agent arrived, inspected the package and performed a field test of the white
powdery substance, confirming it to be cocaine.83 A short time later, more DEA agents arrived,
inspected the package for themselves and performed another field test, which confirmed the
results of the initial field test.84 The DEA agents then obtained a warrant to search the place
where the package was addressed, executed the warrant, and arrested Jacobsen.85 The United
States District Court of Minnesota declined to suppress the evidence and Jacobsen was convicted
of possession with intent to distribute.86 Jacobsen appealed to the United States Court of Appeals

United States v. Lichtenberger: The Sixth Circuit Improperly Narrowed The Private Search Doctrine Of The Fourth
Amendment In a Case of Child Pornography On A Digital Device, 49 Creighton L. Rev. 177, 180 (2015); This paper
does not comment of the Supreme Court’s introduction and perceived expansion of the private search doctrine. For
an interesting criticism of the Court’s decision in Jacobsen please see Kim A. Lambert, United States v. Jacobsen:
Expanded Private Search Doctrine Undermining Fourth Amendment Values, 16 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 359 (1985).

79
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).

80
Id.

81
Id.

82
Id.

83
Id.

84
Id. 111-12.

85
Id.

86
Jacobsen, 683 F.2d 296, 298 (8th Cir. 1982).

for the Eighth Circuit.87 The Eighth Circuit focused primarily on the agents’ field tests.88 The
court ultimately reversed Jacobsen’s conviction, ruling that the field test expanded the private
search and required a warrant.89 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.90
In reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court focused entirely on the initial search
conducted by the FedEx employees.91 The Court reasoned that the DEA agents’ subsequent field
tests did not require a warrant because the “initial invasion” of Jacobsen’s package occurred
during a private search.92 Therefore, according to Justice Stevens, even though the field tests
exceed the scope of the private search, it was not a search under Katz, because it could “not
compromise any legitimate expectation of privacy.”93 The positive test did not remove the
reasonable expectation of privacy; instead that fact that whatever the white powder turned out to
be was no longer a “private fact” there was no longer a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.94
The Court was not willing to accept Jacobsen’s argument that the office manager’s decision to
contact federal authorities made him a government actor.95 Further, the Court declared that the

87
Id. at 299-300.

88
Id.

89
Id.

90
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 112-13.

91
Id. at 115.

92
Id.

93
Id.

94
Id. at 123.

95
See Id. at 114-15 (“The fact that agents of the private carrier independently opened the package and made
an examination that might have been impermissible for a government agent cannot render otherwise reasonable
official conduct unreasonable…[Here] the initial invasions of respondents’ package were occasioned by private
action.”).

motivation behind the employees’ conduct was irrelevant in applying the private search
doctrine.96

II.Applying The Private Search Doctrine To The Digital World
The private search doctrine has justified searches in the digital world in a number of
different contexts.97 The most common cases include computer repairpersons,98 hacktivists,99 and
Internet service providers100. The following cases illustrate different ways in which state and
federal courts of appeals have applied the private search doctrine in these instances.
A. The Computer Repairperson
In State v. Lasaga, the Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the conviction of a college
professor whose computer download history was monitored and reported by a student employed
by the university to law enforcement.101 Professor Lasaga was employed by Yale University as a

96
See Id. at 115 (it is irrelevant whether the intrusion was “accidental or deliberate”).

97
See e.g., State v. Horton, 962 So.2d 459, 463 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2007) (computer repairman discovering
evidence of child pornography in the ordinary course of business is not a search under the Fourth Amendment);
State v. Lasaga, 848 A.2d 1149 (Conn. 2004) (student employed by a university as a computer technician was not
acting as a government agent when he monitored defendant’s computer and reported that he was downloading child
pornography); United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (computer hacker acted as a private citizen
when they hacked into defendant’s computer and provided law enforcement with evidence of child pornography);
United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 829-30 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that AOL was operating as private actor,
not a state agent, when it decided to has email traffic for child pornography and other contraband); United States v.
Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding same).

98
See Lasaga, 848 A.2d 1149 (Conn. 2004); Horton, 962 So.2d 459, 463 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2007).

99
See Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003).

100
See Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 829-30 (8th Cir. 2013).

101
Lasaga, 848 A.2d 1149 (Conn. 2004).

professor of geology and geophysics.102 On October 23, 1998, Victor Sletten, a Yale graduate
student, informed Pal Gluhosky, a Yale employee responsible for ensuring that the geology
department computers were functioning properly, that another student told him that Professor
Lasaga downloaded child pornography onto his geology department office computer. 103
Gluhosky decided to monitor Professor Lasaga’s download history.104 From October 23 through
October 30, 1998, Gluhosky monitored Professor Lasaga’s download activity and suspected that
the Professor was in fact downloading child pornography.105 Gluhosky communicated his
suspicions to his supervisors and was instructed to continue his activities.106
On November 3, Gluhosky provided law enforcement with hard copies of computer logs
detailing Lasaga’s computer activities and a CD that contained copies of images that the
defendant had downloaded to a computer in the geology department.107 This information was
subsequently turned over to the FBI.108 Based on Gluhosky’s information, federal officials
obtained a search warrant for Professor Lasaga’s residence.109 During the search, FBI agents
seized Lasaga’s computer, zip drives, floppy discs, compact discs, two homemade videotapes,
and other items.110 Based on this evidence, Lasaga was charged with two counts of sexual assault

102
Id. at 1152.

103
Id.

104
Id.

105
Id.

106
Id.

107
Id.

108
Id. at 1153.

109
Id. at 1153-54.

110

in the first degree, two counts of promoting a minor in an obscene performance, and two counts
of risk of injury to a child.111 Lasaga filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the
FBI’s search, which was denied by trial court denied.112 Lasaga then pled, but reserved the right
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.113
In upholding the trial court’s denial of Lasaga’s motion to suppress, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut agreed that Gluhosky’s actions did not implicate the Fourth Amendment as he was
acting as a private party while monitoring Lasaga’s computer activities.114 The court found that
the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that “Gluhosky was in no way acting as an agent
of the government in obtaining the information and material which was utilized by [the FBI] in
drafting the search warrant.”115 The police did not seek out Gluhosky and were not involved in
his decision to obtain information regarding Lasaga’s computer activities.116 The court also
emphasized that Gluhosky had no previous connection with the police and received nothing in
return for his cooperation.117 While there was a dispute in the record regarding whether law
enforcement asked Gluhosky to continue to monitor Lasaga and provide them with information
or whether Gluhosky independently decided to do so, the court was indifferent as to the
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significance of this discrepancy.118 The court ultimately determined that “police involvement was
not so extensive as to have created an agency relationship between Gluhosky and the police.”119
Similarly, in State v. Horton, The Second Circuit Court of Appeal for Louisiana found
that a computer repairman’s actions in the ordinary course of business did not qualify as a search
under the Fourth Amendment.120 In this case, Robert Horton took his computer to a local Best
Buy for repairs.121 Horton instructed the computer technician, Christopher Stoll, to install a new
hard drive, but not to remove the old one.122 After installing the new hard drive, Stoll followed
Best Buy’s “post-op procedure” to see if he could repair issues related to problems with the
computer’s power button and monitor display “flickering and shaking.”123 In doing so, Stoll
decided to view an image from his own thumb drive, as was common procedure used by Best
Buy technicians.124 Stoll then accessed the Microsoft Paint program to open the media file.125
When Stoll opened Microsoft paint a default picture directory entitled “My Pictures”
automatically opened and Stoll saw six thumbnail pictures of nude children engaged in sexual
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acts.126 Stoll immediately alerted other Best Buy employees and they decided to call the
police.127
District Attorney investigator and computer forensics expert, Mark Fargerson, responded
to the call and the Best Buy employees showed him the images they discovered.128 Fargerson
then viewed additional images and determined they were in fact child pornography.129 This
information was then used to obtain a search warrant for Horton’s computer.130 The subsequent
search revealed over 100 pages of child pornography.131 Horton filed a motion to suppress the
evidence, arguing that the “court should set some guidelines in what is a permissible private
search by a computer technician.”132 Horton also argued that Fargerson exceeded the scope of the
private search by the Best Buy employees because he “did additional procedures in opening and
enlarging the photos[.]”133
The trial court denied Horton’s motion to suppress and Horton appealed.134 The appellate
court agreed with the trial court’s denial of Horton’s motion to suppress.135 The court noted that
there is “no merit” to Horton’s argument that the Best Buy employees were acting on behalf of
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law enforcement.136 The court found that the discovery of the unlawful pornographic images by
the Best Buy employees was “inadvertent and unexpected.”137 Accordingly, the search qualified
as a private search because it not connected to state authority in any way.138
B. The Hacktivist
Hacktivism is the act of hacking a website or computer network in an effort to convey a
social or political message.139 Unlike malicious hackers, who invade computers or networks with
the intent to cause harm, the hacktivist is usually motivated by a desire to serve a social cause.140
A well-known example is the hacker group, Anonymous.141 In 2015, the group announced
“Operation Death Eaters” in the wake of the Westminster child abuse scandal142 in London.143 In
doing so, Anonymous vowed to target anyone connected to the scandal as well as the general
child porn issue that was overwhelming British authorities.144 Similarly, in United States v.
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Jarrett, the FBI and local enforcement agents received incriminating information via email from
a hacker known only as “Unknownuser”.145
Beginning in July 2000, Unknownuser began to supply federal and state officials with
information related the downloading and sharing of child pornography.146 Dr. Bradley Steiger
was the first individual Unknownuser exposed to the FBI.147 Unknownuser gained entry into
Steiger’s computer via a “Trojan Horse”148 program attached to a picture Unknownuser posted to
a news group frequented by pornography enthusiasts.149 Once Steiger downloaded the picture to
his own computer, the Trojan horse program was also downloaded and Unknownuser was able to
enter Steiger’s computer undetected.150 Unknownuser then searched Steiger’s hard drive and
found evidence of child pornography, which he supplied to law enforcement.151
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someone “from Istanbul, Turkey,” who could not “afford an overseas phone call and cannot speak English
fluently”).
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A Trojan horse (“Trojan”) is one of the most popular methods used by hackers and cybercriminals alike to
gain access into an unsuspecting computer. The term comes from the well-known Greek fable, in which the Greeks
presented the Trojans with a giant wooden horse as a peace offering. Unbeknownst to the Trojans, the hollow
wooden horse concealed Greek soldiers who eventually sprung out and assisted the Greeks in sacking Troy.
Similarly, a Trojan Horse program presents itself as a helpful computer program while hiding its true purpose. They
can be delivered to users through email or can be attached to files made available on the Internet for download. After
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In November 2000, FBI Special Agent Duffy attempted to convince Unknownuser to
reveal his identity and testify in Steiger’s case.152 Despite Agent Duffy’s assurances that
Unknownuser would not be prosecuted for his hacking activities, Unknownuser refused to
testify.153 After repeated failed attempts to convince Unknownuser to testify, Agent Duffy
thanked Unknownuser for his assistance and stated, “[i]f you want to bring other information
forward, I am available.”154
Unknownuser did not contact law enforcement officials again until December 2001,
when he sent an unsolicited email to law enforcement in Alabama.155 Unknownuser informed
law enforcement that he had “found another child molester[,]” who he identified as William
Jarrett.156 On December 4, 2001, Unknownuser sent thirteen email messages to law enforcement;
including a “ten-part series of email with some forty-five attached files containing the ‘evidence’
that Unknownuser had collected on Jarrett.”157 Jarrett was indicted and arrested shortly
thereafter.158 As before, FBI Agent Duffy again contacted Unknownuser and thanked him for his
assistance in identifying Jarrett.159 Unknownuser and Agent Duffy exchanged emails and Agent
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Duffy encouraged Unknownuser to remain in contact with a fellow agent, Agent Faulkner, via
her personal email address.160
After being indicted on child pornography charges, Jarrett moved to suppress the
evidence obtained against him.161The district court denied the motion and Jarrett entered a
conditional guilty plea.162 Prior to sentencing however, Jarrett reconsidered his earlier motion to
suppress on the basis of new evidence revealing a series of emails exchanged between
Unknownuser and FBI Agent Faulkner, begging shorty after Jarrett’s arrest.163 The government
did not disclose these emails until after Jarrett entered his guilty plea.164 Specifically, Jarrett
pointed to a series of emails dated December 19, 2001, in which Agent Faulkner explicitly
thanked Unknownuser for providing the information to law enforcement.165
Over the next few months, Agent Faulkner and Unknownuser maintained what the
district court described as a “pen-pal” type correspondence.166 Agent Faulkner repeatedly
expressed thanks and even admiration for Unknownuser’s assistance.167 Unknownuser told
Agent Faulkner that he would continue his hacking activities and Agent Faulkner never
discouraged that.168 Upon consideration of the series of emails, the district court reversed its
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earlier decision and suppressed the evidence.169 In doing so, the court reasoned that the “totality
of all the contact between law enforcement and Unknownuser encouraged Unknownuser to
continue his behavior and to remain in contact with the FBI.”170 The district court concluded that
the Government and Unknownuser had “expressed their consent to an agency relationship[]” and
the evidence obtained on the basis of Unknownuser’s hacking activities violated Jarrett’s Fourth
Amendment rights.171 The government appealed.172
The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Coolidge
and Skinner in describing the private search doctrine and setting out the government agent test.173
While the Government conceded that Unkownuser intended to assist law enforcement, it argued
that the Government did not know or acquiesce in Unknownuser’s search “in a manner sufficient
to transform Unknownuser into an agent of the Government” to make the search
unconstitutional.174 The burden is placed on the defendant to “demonstrate that the Government
knew of and acquiesced in the private search and that the private individual intended to assist law
enforcement authorities.175 However, the 4th Circuit noted that they have “required evidence of
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the circumstances.” (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1989)).

174
Id. at 344-45.

175
Id. at 345.

more than mere knowledge and passive acquiesce by the Government before finding an agency
relationship.”176 With these principles in mind, the 4th Circuit rejected Jarrett’s contentions that
Unknownuser was acting as a government agent.177
In reversing the district court’s decision to suppress the evidence against Jarrett, the 4th
Circuit emphasized the fact that Unknownuser’s email exchange with Faulkner took place after
Unknownuser had hacked into Jarrett’s computer and after the “fruits of Unknownuser’s
hacking” had been made available to the FBI.178 The court found that Faulkner’s “knowledge and
acquiescence was entirely post-search.”179 The court reasoned “such after-the-fact conduct
cannot serve to transform the prior relationship between Unknownuser and the Government into
an agency relationship with respect to the search of Jarrett’s computer.”180 While the Government
“operated close to the line” in this case, Jarrett failed to “demonstrate the requisite level of
knowledge and acquiesce sufficient to make Unknownuser a Government Agent when he hacked
into Jarrett’s computer.”181 Even though the Government did not “actively discourage”
Unknownuser from engaging in illegal hacking this did not transform him into a Government
agent.182 Even though the 4th Circuit described the Government’s behavior as “discomforting[,]”
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they noted that the Government is under no “special obligation” to discourage these types of
activities.183
C. The Internet Service Provider
AOL is a well-known Internet service provider (“ISP”) that provides email and web services
to its users.184 AOL identifies certain files that “may damage its network” with “hash values.”185
A hash value is “an algorithmic calculation that yields an alphanumeric value for a file.”186 Files
containing child pornography were amongst those files AOL assigned hash values.187 During the
regular course of business, AOL scans files sent through its network with a tool it calls the
“Image Detection and Filtering Process.”188 When the program detects files with a hash value
associated with child pornography, it automatically forwards a report to the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children.189
In September 2010, the filtering program triggered an alert for images depicting child
pornography being sent from the e-mail account of Jeremy Stevenson.190 Law enforcement
officials obtained a search warrant for Stevenson’s home and eventually uncovered a large
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quantity of child pornography stored on his computers and digital storage devices. 191 Stevenson
was indicted on charges of possessing child pornography.192 Stevenson filed a motion to suppress
the images discovered by AOL, arguing that the ISP’s scanning of his emails violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.193 The district court denied the motion, explaining that AOL was a private
actor and was therefore not constrained by the Fourth Amendment.194 Stevenson entered a
conditional guilty plea, while reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress.195
On appeal, Stevenson argued that AOL acted as a government agent when it scanned his
emails because Title 18, United States Code Section 2258A(a) “requires AOL to report to the
National Center [for Missing and Exploited Children] any apparent violation of the child
pornography laws that AOL discovers while providing electronic communication services.”196
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Skinner, Stevenson likened Section 2258A(a) to the
testing requirements that made optional tests amount to state action.197 Additionally, Section
2258B(a) ISPs from suit arising from the performance of the reporting responsibilities implied
therein.
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The 8th Circuit summarily rejected this argument and found that the regulations at issue
neither authorized AOL to scan its users’ emails and did not remove legal barriers to scanning by
preempting private contracts that forbid scans.198 The court concluded that the “only similarity
between the statutes that Stevenson cites and the Skinner regulations in that both include
reporting obligations.”199 However, a reporting requirement, standing alone, “does not transform
an Internet service provide into a government agent whenever it chooses to scan files sent on its
network for child pornography.”200

III.

Riley v. California and the Supreme Court’s Push To Protect Data Privacy
In Riley v. California, a unanimous Supreme Court held that police officers may not

search an individual’s cellphone incident to arrest and must generally secure a warrant before
conducting a search of an arrestee’s cell phone.201 In Riley, the Court considered two cases
presenting a common question: do law enforcement agents need to acquire a search warrant
before they search an arrestee’s cellular phone.202
In the first case, David Riley was stopped by a police officer for driving with expired
registration tags.203 During the stop, the officer discovered that Riley’s driver’s license had been
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suspended.204 Pursuant to department policy, the officer impounded Riley’s vehicle and
conducted an inventory search of the car.205 The officer discovered two handguns hidden under
the cars hood and Riley was arrested for unlicensed possession of concealed and loaded
firearms.206 An officer then searched Riley incident to arrest and found evidence associated with
the “Bloods” street gang.207 Upon accessing Riley’s smartphone, the officer noticed some words
or contacts preceded by the letters “CK” or “Crip Killers.”208 Two hours later, at the police
station a detective from the gang squad went through Riley’s phone, searching for further
evidence of gang affiliation.209 During the search, the detective found photographs of Riley
standing in front of a car they suspected to have been involved in a shooting a few weeks
earlier.210 Riley was subsequently charged in connection with the shooting and sentenced to a
term of fifteen years to life in prison.211
In the second case, a police officer observed Brima Wurie make a drug sale from his
car.212 After arresting him and brining him to the police station, the officers seized two of Wurie’s
cellphones.213 Unlike Riley’s case however, Wurie’s phone was a “flip phone.”214 The police
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noticed that Wurie’s phone was repeatedly receiving calls from a source identified as “my house”
on the phone’s external screen.215 Eventually, the officers opened the phone and observed a photo
of a woman and baby set as the phone’s wallpaper.216After accessing the call log, the police were
able determine the phone number associated with the “my house” label and traced it to Wurie’s
apartment building.217 The officers went to the building, saw Wurie’s name on a mailbox and
observed a woman through the window who resembled the wallpaper photo on Wurie’s phone.218
Based on the information from the cellphone and their observations, the officers obtained a
search warrant and searched Wurie’s apartment.219 The subsequent search uncovered 215 grams
of crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and cash.220 Wurie
was convicted of numerous offenses was sentenced to 262 months in prison.221
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated both cases.222 In describing the
social significance of cellphones, the Court characterized them as being a “pervasive and
insistent part of daily life.” 223 So much so that Chief Justice Roberts quipped that the “proverbial
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visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.” 224 While
Riley and Wurie utilized phones with “varying levels of sophistication,” the Riley Court noted
that both devices are based on technologies that were “inconceivable” when seminal cases like
Chimel and Robinson were decided.225 Accordingly, the Court refused to extend the rational of
these cases to cell phone searches, instead mandating that officers generally secure a warrant
before conducting a search.226
The Court observed that cell phones differ in both a quantitative and qualitative sense
from other objects that might be carried on an arrestee’s person.227 Considering that the Court
described cell phones as “minicomputers” capable of storing immense amounts of data, this
conclusion is not surprising.228 Additionally, the Court noted that cell phones collect many
distinct types of data and create numerous privacy issues.229 With this in mind, the Court
declined to extend the primary Chimel rationales230 to this case.231
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26, 2014) (noting that while dicta the language suggests that individuals have constitutionally protected privacy

First, the Court noted that unlike physical objects, digital data does not pose a risk to
officer safety.232 Second, the Court dismissed the Government’s concerns related to evidence
preservation.233 Further, Chief Justice Roberts explained that while Robinson’s categorical rule
allowing searches upon every lawful custodial arrest struck the “appropriate balance in the
context of physical objects,” its rationales lost logical force with respect to the “digital content on
cell phones.”234 Ultimately, the Riley Court limited Robinson’s search incident to arrest rationale
in cases involving cell phones.235 Katie Matejka astutely notes that the Riley Court made its
holding clear: “it is not the case that cell phones may never be searched by law enforcement – it
is that law enforcement must first obtain a warrant to search the cell phone.”236
IV.

The Current Circuit Split: Riley’s Impact On The Private Search Doctrine

interest in each of these categories of information, at least for purposes of a government search of their personal
devices)
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Chimel, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (adopting the search incident to arrest exception and stating that it
is reasonable for law enforcement to search a person being lawfully arrested for weapons or evidence).
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Search Doctrine Of The Fourth Amendment In a Case of Child Pornography On A Digital Device, 49 Creighton L.
Rev. 177, 185 (2015).

The Court’s decision in Riley was hailed by many in the media as a “sweeping victory for
privacy rights in the digital age.”237 Commentators suggested that the Supreme Court had
“entered the digital age and fundamentally changed how the Constitution protects our
privacy.”238 Others remained cautiously optimistic that this decision signals that the Court is
more prepared to engage in the challenges of the digital age ahead.239 However, the decision has
created a circuit split amongst lower courts, particularly related to the scope of the private search
doctrine.240
When evaluating searches of electronic devices, Professor Orin Kerr explains that the
application of the private search doctrine raises the following inquiry: “When a private party sees
a file on a computer, what exactly has been searched for purposes of later reconstruction?”241 Put
another way, the scope of the private search doctrine governs “whether authorities can search an
237
See Adam Liptak, Major Ruling Shields Privacy of Cellphone: Supreme Court Says Phones Can’t Be
Searched Without a Warrant, The New York Times (June 25, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/us/supreme-court-cellphones-search-privacy.html?_r=0.
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change and social practice); Marc Rotenberg and Alan Butler, Symposium: In Riley v. California, a unanimous
Supreme Court sets out Fourth Amendment for digital age, SCOTUSblog (June 26, 2014),
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entire collection of devices (e.g., CDs, USB or external hard drives) after a private party
searched only a subset of the devices.”242 The answer, according to Professor Kerr, is dependent
upon what the right “measuring unit” is.243 Is it “the data, the file, the folder, the physical device,
or something else?”244 Prior to the Supreme Courts decision in Riley, the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits adopted the single unit or physical device approach.245 However, in post-Riley decisions,
the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a data or file level approach.246 The following
subsections analyze these different approaches, their underlying principles, and how they were
impacted by the Court’s decision in Riley.
A. Pre-Riley: Substantial Certainty And The Single Unit Approach247
In United States v. Runyan, the Fifth Circuit adopted the single unit approach.248 In this case,
defendant Robert Runyan became estranged from his wife, Judith, and subsequently filed for
divorce.249 In the months following their separation, Judith made several trips to Runyan’s home
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to retrieve her personal property.250 On one of these occasions, Judith found a desktop computer
she claimed was hers.251 Judith and her friend took the computer as well as a number of floppy
disks, CDs, and ZIP disks that were on the desk and on the floor.252 Later, Judith’s friend viewed
“approximately twenty of the CDS and floppy disks” and found they contained images of child
pornography.253 Judith and her friend turned the materials over to law enforcement.254 The police
subsequently reviewed the disks without obtaining a warrant and uncovered more evidence of
child pornography.255 Runyan was indicted on child pornography charges.256
Runyan filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the pre-warrant searches of the disks violated
the Fourth Amendment.257 The trial court denied the motion, finding that the pre-warrant police
searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment because “the police did not exceed the scope of
the private search conducted by Judith and her companions.”258 Runyan was then convicted and
sentenced to 300 months in prison.259 Runyan appealed, arguing in relevant part that the trial
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court erred in “failing to suppress the evidence obtained directly and indirectly from the prewarrant police searches.”260
The Fifth Circuit initially stated that a defendant’s expectation of privacy with respect to an
unopened container is “persevered unless the defendant’s expectation of privacy in the contents
of the container has already been frustrated because the contents were rendered obvious by the
private search.”261 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that this policy would prevent “fishing
expeditions” and ensure that police officers are “substantially certain” of the contents before they
open the container.262 Accordingly, the court concluded that the police’s pre-warrant examination
of the disks not viewed by Judith or her friend “clearly exceeded the scope of the private
search.”263 The court emphasized the lack of any identifying marks on the disks that would alert
an ordinary viewer of their contents.264 Additionally, it was not enough that the disks were found
in the same location of Runyan’s residence where other evidence of child pornography was
found.265 Therefore, the court concluded the police “exceeded the scope of the private search
[…] when they examined disks that the private searches did not examine.”266
Despite the suppression of the unviewed disks, the court refused to accept Runyan’s argument
that the police also exceeded the scope of the private search because they examined more files on
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the disks than the private searchers did.267 Even though the record did not clearly indicate what
files Judith and her friend initially viewed, the court did not suppress this evidence.268
The Fifth Circuit explained, in the context of a closed container search police do not exceed
the private search when they examine more items within the closed container that the private
individuals did not.269 Accordingly, the Runyan court concluded, “police do not engage in a new
‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes each time they examine a particular item found within
the container.”270 In this case, the container was the disk and the prior private search eliminated
any expectation of privacy in the container.271 Utilizing this approach, a more “detailed police
search of the containers […] did not offend the Fourth Amendment.272 Holding otherwise would
“over-deter” law enforcement from “engaging in lawful investigation of containers where any
reasonable expectation of privacy has already been eroded.”273
The Seventh Circuit adopted Runyan’s reasoning in Rann v. Atchison.274 In this case,
defendant Steven Rann was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual assault and one count of
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child pornography.275 The defendant’s 15-year-old daughter, S.R., reported to law enforcement
officials that he had sexually assaulted her.276 S.R. also supplied the police with a digital camera
memory card containing images of Rann sexually assaulting S.R.277 Sometime later, S.R.’s
mother brought police a computer zip drive that contained additional pornographic images of
S.R. and her half-sister, K.G.278 Rann did not move to suppress the images found on the zip drive
and camera memory.279 However, after being convicted Rann filed a habeas petition asserting
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppresses the images recovered from
the storage devices.280 The Illinois Appellate Court denied the motion and Rann appealed.281
The 7th Circuit rejected Rann’s argument that police exceeded the scope of the private search
when it viewed additional items on the storage devices without first obtaining a
warrant.282Applying the principles of Runyan, the 7th Circuit additionally stated that even if the
police “more thoroughly” searched the digital storage devices the police search did not “exceed
or expand” the scope of the initial private search.283 The Rann court reasoned that this is because
S.R. and her mother knew the contents of the storage devices and police were “substantially
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certain” that the devices contained child pornography.284 Accordingly, law enforcement was free
to search the entire device without warrant and without violating the Fourth Amendment.285

B. Post-Riley: Narrowing The Scope Of The Private Search Doctrine And The File Level
Approach
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a
“much narrower” scope for the private search doctrine as it applies to electronic devices.286 First,
in United States v. Lichtenberger, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
concluded that law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment when it viewed the contents of
the defendant’s computer without a warrant.287 In this case, defendant Lichtenberger and his
girlfriend, Karley Holmes, lived together.288 After Holmes learned that the defendant was
previously convicted of child pornography offenses she had him removed from the shared
home.289 Later that day, Holmes retrieved the defendant’s laptop with intention of searching it for
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Lichtenberger had an active warrant for failing to register as a sex offender.).

evidence of child pornography.290 After hacking the password, Holmes “clicked on different
folders” and eventually found thumbnail images of “adults engaging in sexual acts with
minors.”291 After clicking through several of the images, Holmes closed the computer and
contacted the police.292
Officer Huston responded to the call and asked Holmes to show him what he discovered.293
Holmes proceeded to “open several folders” and “began clicking on random thumbnail images”
to show the officer.294 Officer Huston recognized the images as child pornography and asked
Holmes to shut down the laptop.295 Holmes later testified that she viewed approximately 100
images of child pornography saved in “several subfolders inside a folder entitled ‘private’.”296
Additionally, she testified that she showed Officer Huston “a few pictures” from these files.297
However, Holmes was “not sure” if they were among the original images she had seen in her
original search.298 Lichtenberger was indicted on child pornography charges.299 The defendant
filed a motion to suppress, arguing that “when Officer Huston directed Holmes to show him what
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she had found, [she] was acting as an agent of the government[,]” in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.300 Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Riley, the district court granted
Lichtenberger’s motion to suppress the laptop evidence.301 The Government appealed.302
In upholding the district court’s decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals first concluded
that Holmes’s initial search qualified as a private search.303 However, the Lichtenberger Court
found that the scope of Officer Huston’s search exceeded that of Holmes’ private search.304 In
reaching this conclusion, the court focused on the Riley Court’s concerns305 related to the
immense storage capacity of digital devices and the implications such data has on privacy
concerns.306 It is because of these concerns that the court reasoned that Lichtenberger’s laptop
should be afforded the same level of protection as the cell phones in Riley.307 Additionally, the
court emphasized that the police could not be “virtually certain” that the subsequent search was
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limited to the images Holmes previously viewed.308 Even though the images viewed by law
enforcement were evidence of child pornography they could have revealed any other amount of
private information unrelated to the crime.309 This lack of certainty was “dispositive” and
supported the court’s decision to uphold the district court’s suppression of the evidence.310
The Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar approach in United States v. Johnson.311 In this case,
defendants Alan Johnson and Jennifer Sparks accidently left their cell phone at a Wal-Mart
store.312 Linda Vo, a Wal-Mart employee, found the phone and arranged to return it to the codefendants.313 However, before returning it Vo decided to look at the contents of the phone,
which was not password-protected.314 Upon doing so, Vo discovered images and videos of child
pornography.315
Vo told her fiancé, David Widner, that she saw some “pretty weird” pictures involving a
young girl.316 Widner decided to view the images himself and scrolled through all of the
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thumbnail images in the phone’s photo album.317 He also opened a few images to full size and
watched one video.318 After showing them to Vo, they contacted the police and turned over the
phone.319 Detective O’Reilly subsequently viewed the images on the phone, confirming they
were in fact child pornography.320 Detective O’Reilly opened all of the images to full size and
viewed both the video that Widner had seen and another Widner had not.321 Johnson and Sparks
filed motions to suppress, which the district court denied.322
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that Detective O’Reilly did not exceed the scope of the
private search when he looked at photos – thumbnail and full-size images - or watched videos
that Widner had viewed.323 However, the court found that Detective O’Reily did exceed the
scope of the private search when he watched the video Widner had not watched.324 The court
reasoned that allowing the second video to be admitted, “when no private party had first watched
it” would run afoul of the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley. As in Lichtenberg, the Johnson
court focused on the Supreme Court’s emphasis of data storage and privacy implications.325 The
court stated that a search of the cell phone may have “removed certain information from the
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Fourth Amendment’s protections,” but not all of it.326 Accordingly, the officer’s viewing of the
second video exceeded the scope of the private search and was suppressed.327
V.

Conclusion
While this paper does not advocate for a particular approach, the author recognizes that
there are strong proponents and critics on both sides.328 In analyzing the current circuit split,
the author hopes to have demonstrated the need for the Supreme Court to take action and
settle the current split. This becomes clear when one recognizes that the only thing that
distinguishes these factually similar fact patterns is the Riley decision.329
The Pre-Riley cases, Runyan and Rann, hold that a private search of one file in an
electronic device opens the entire device up subsequent search by law enforcement. The PostRiley cases, Lichtenberger and Johnson, mirror Riley and focus on the privacy implications
associated with searching private data. Accordingly, these cases hold that a subsequent law
enforcement search cannot exceed the specific files viewed. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Riley has impacted the application of the private search doctrine, even though it is not a
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private search case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should settle the current circuit split and
clarify the contours of Fourth Amendment in the digital world.

